Nigeria and the wind of change in Africa, by Aminu Habibu Jahun
African ruling parties are becoming politically endangered. Against their sit tight syndrome, they meet their Waterloo in youth dominated oppositional coalitions.
Before delving into Africa’s wind of change, there is an oppositional light from
Latin America: an Argentine two party political coalition, known as the Front For All fielded Alberto Fernandez as its presidential candidate, who trounced the incumbent President, Mauricio Macri in a 2019 election.
The year 2024 could be Africa’s year of democratic revitalisation and resilience, in which scores of ruling parties were swept away by the wind of change blowing across the continent’s democratic spaces, which should embolden Nigeria’s opposition to brace up for the encounter in 2027.
First In the year, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), an oppositional coalition in Botswana defeated the Botswana Democratic Party, which had continously been in power for 58 years, won only 4 elected parliamentary seats out of the 69 in the 2024 election.
Thirdly, in the 2024 Ghanian presidential election, the ruling party, NPP was defeated by the NDC, coasting home to victory with majority parliamentary seats, leaving the defeated ruling party with minority seats in Parliament.
Fourth, as in 1982 and 1995, in 2024 the Mauritius oppositional coalition, ADC landslidely defeated the ruling coalition, LEPEP, with a 62 majority parliamentary seats, leaving only 27 for the defeated ruling coalition.
Fifth in 2024, the authoritarian onslaught of Senegalese President Macky Sall, who extended the franchise, and incarcerated the opposition leaders, was effectively contained through mass youth mobilisation and an independent judiciary, which saved Senegalese democracy, facilitated Bassirou Faye’s victory over president Sall’s annointed candidate.
READ ALSO: Trumps and customised democracies in Africa, by Aminu Habibu Jahun
Sixth, in crisis ridden Horn of Africa’s Somaliland, the ruling party, Kulmiye which had uninterruptedly been in power since 2010, was defeated in 2024 by the Abdullahi led opposition Wadanni party.
Seventh, South Africa’s ANC which for thirty years ago singly dominated political power, was electorally humbled in the 2024 elections, losing parliamentary dominance, forcing it into a post electoral coalition to form a government.
In view of the fact that economic difficulties were the mobilisationsal undercurrents, which paved way for the opposition to capture political power in the highlighted African nations, despite the fact that their problems might not be as endemic as those in Nigeria, the nation could be denied the wind of change blowing across Africa’s democratic spaces due to the followings:
First, the major opposition parties are victims of deadly externally engineered factional crises, transforming some of the factions into the political extensions of the ruling party, defocusing them from vibrant oppositional politics.
Secondly, some of the governors in the leading opposition party, are alleged to have secretly pledged to work for the reelection of PBAT in the next election.
Thirdly, personal political ambition would hardly allow the leading opposition leaders to subordinate their private political goals to wider oppositional objectives.
Fourth, unfortunately for Nigeria’s opposition, the Nigerian Judiciary isn’t like the Senegalese Judiciary, which impartially saved Senegalese democracy in 2024. And most likely, the judiciaries of the other countries are as impartial and independent as the Senegalese.
Fifth, if a multi oppositional coalition is formed, the devils in the details are: presidential ticket and geopolitical considerations. Should the coalition field a single presidential ticket? Or, should all parties field their candidates urging their supporters to vote any of them? Or, should the party with the largest number of subnational governments provide the candidate, with the running mate from any of the parties with a subnational government? Or, should the two leading parties in the last election provide the presidential ticket? Or, should the presidential platform be unconstrained by party size, subnational clout and performance in the last election?
Sixth, the block voting by the South East, and its rising clamour to produce the next president, could be a cog in the wheel of progress of the coalition. Any coalition which gambles with a six million block voting geopolitical entity is undertaking a dangerous electoral risk.
Seventh, the ruling party’s toxic reach in the major opposition parties, is palpably an undeclared ruling coalition, constituted by the the APC and the factions fuelling unending internal crises in the PDP, LP and NNPP.
The above posers highlight the difficulties of consummating an effective multiparty coalition in a weak democracy. It would have been easier for a single party opposition ( like the APC ), or a two party coalition ( like the Peronists and Kirchnerists of Argentina) to cross the hurdles of a presidential platform and geopolitical factors.
Should the opposition fail to forge a formidable front in 2027, and if politics is narrowly conceived as the capacity of an individual to dominate authoritative allocation of values in society for a long time, then PBAT would be the most skilled politician, not only in the the Fourth Republic, but in the preceding republics as well.
Jahun is a commentator on public affairs. He writes from Dutse, the Jigawa State Capital. He can be reached on 07039038088.
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