Kano politics, defection, and the opposition imperative, by Engr. Bello Gwarzo Abdullahi, FNSE
The political drama unfolding in Kano presents both challenges and opportunities. As ever, all politics is local. Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf’s January 2026 defection from the New Nigeria People’s Party (NNPP) to the All Progressives Congress (APC) can only be properly understood within Kano’s peculiar political history. Far from being a one-off event, it reflects a recurring Kano pattern: the collision between executive authority and godfatherism.
Yet this episode departs from expectations, given the long-standing political closeness between Governor Abba and his estranged mentor. Coming at a time when opposition unity is sorely needed—and when Kano ought to be at the vanguard—whatever may have informed the Governor’s decision is, at best, unfortunate. The timing is especially troubling given the country’s economic, social, and political distress, which now, more than ever, demands a committed and coordinated opposition capable of holding the ruling party to account.
In Kano, this moment echoes the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) crisis of the Second Republic. Then, radical populist politics fractured under the weight of its own internal contradictions. As today, Kano’s progressive tradition produced tension between a sitting governor who controlled the machinery of state and an influential party leader who commanded moral authority and popular loyalty.
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With its ascent to governance, the PRP gradually lost cohesion. Two camps soon emerged: the Tabo faction loyal to Malam Aminu Kano and the party hierarchy, and the Santsi faction led by progressive governors—most notably Abubakar Rimi in Kano and Balarabe Musa in Kaduna. These governors began coordinating with other opposition figures against the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) through what became known as the Progressive Governors’ bloc. Aminu Kano viewed this as ideological dilution and betrayal.
The governors were suspended, Rimi eventually defected to the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), and the PRP was fatally weakened. Although the party retained Kano briefly—producing Senator Sabo Bakinzuwo as governor for a short interlude—the military takeover of 1983 soon ended the experiment. The lesson was stark: internal rupture proved counterproductive and deeply divisive.
There are, however, important differences between Governor Yusuf’s exit from the NNPP and the Rimi–Aminu Kano rupture. In the Second Republic, popular frustration with the NPN pushed Rimi, Balarabe Musa, and other progressive governors into opposition alliances. In today’s Kano, the dynamic is reversed: the sitting governor has crossed over to a ruling party widely resented for presiding over severe economic hardship.
The defining similarity, however, is rebellion against the mentor. Both PRP and NNPP were constructed around dominant personalities—Aminu Kano then, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso now. Such movements thrive in opposition but struggle in government.
Once the “student” becomes governor and gains control of budgets, appointments, and security structures, conflict with the “mentor,” who still controls party machinery and symbolic legitimacy, becomes almost inevitable. This is Kano’s recurring political paradox: ideology-centred movements ultimately collide with the practical realities of governance.
Looking ahead, Kano’s political trajectory rests on four broad possibilities. The first is Yusuf’s consolidation within the APC. This remains the most likely outcome if present dynamics persist. Should Yusuf neutralise internal resistance, retain defecting lawmakers through the courts, and establish himself as Kano APC’s dominant figure, the state effectively becomes an APC stronghold. Incumbency combined with federal alignment remains Nigeria’s most reliable electoral formula.
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Control of local governments provides grassroots machinery, while access to Abuja unlocks projects, appointments, and security cooperation. Under these conditions, NNPP would be reduced to a weakened opposition with limited institutional reach. The principal risks to this path are internal: rivalry with legacy APC factions, particularly Ganduje-aligned networks; growing public dissatisfaction; and elite overconfidence. If these are somehow managed—no small task—2027 becomes less competitive and Yusuf does not merely win; he entrenches APC dominance.
The second possibility is a Kwankwasiyya revival. This is the more emotional pathway driven by loyalty, grievance, and nostalgia. Kwankwaso retains a committed base, especially among urban poor communities and youth networks, alongside significant symbolic capital as custodian of Kano’s progressive tradition. The narrative of betrayal carries mobilising power.
Yet history cautions that movements built primarily on charisma struggle once they lose control of state power. Without councils, resources, or federal backing, Kwankwasiyya risks becoming vocal but structurally constrained. Victory would require extraordinary mobilisation combined with serious APC missteps. It is possible, but it would amount to political resurrection rather than routine alternation.
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The third possibility lies in APC implosion. Kano has a long tradition of elite self-sabotage, and the greatest threat to APC dominance may come from within. Competition between Yusuf and entrenched party figures, resistance from older Ganduje-era networks, disputes over ticket allocation, and rival claims to party leadership could escalate into factional warfare.
If that happens, resources fragment, messaging collapses, litigation multiplies, and voter confidence erodes—reopening space for Kwankwasiyya or even a new alignment altogether, just as internal PRP conflict once proved more destructive than external opposition. A similar dynamic played out when Architect Kabiru Ibrahim Gaya of the National Republican Convention defeated Engr. Magaji Abdullahi of the Social Democratic Party, illustrating how elite fragmentation can decisively alter electoral outcomes.
This brings us to the fourth possibility: the African Democratic Congress (ADC) as a platform for opposition regrouping. The ADC is relatively unencumbered by legacy factionalism and increasingly attractive to reform-minded elites, making it better suited as a coalition hub than as a personality vehicle.
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More importantly, Kwankwaso must collaborate with other opposition leaders—across ADC, PDP remnants, Labour-aligned forces, and disaffected APC blocs—to construct a broad anti-incumbent alliance. No single figure, however charismatic, can defeat a federally backed ruling party alone. Nigeria’s electoral reality demands coalitions, not silos.
These dynamics lead to an unavoidable conclusion: Kwankwaso cannot afford isolation. Remaining trapped in a weakened NNPP architecture is strategically unsound. The party has lost its most powerful asset—state incumbency—and risks becoming little more than a vehicle for protest politics. If Kwankwaso is serious about shaping 2027 nationally and reclaiming relevance in Kano, he must pivot decisively.
This requires political maturity: subordinating personal platforms to collective strategy, harmonising messages, sharing structures, and agreeing early on candidate selection frameworks. Without this, opposition forces will remain fragmented, allowing APC to prevail by default rather than by performance.
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Kwankwaso still commands respect, followership, and historical legitimacy. But legacy alone does not win elections. Organisation does. Alliances do. Timing does. If he delays, Kano consolidates under APC and the national opposition enters 2027 divided and diminished. If he acts now—by embracing ADC as a coalition vehicle and working deliberately with fellow opposition leaders—he can help engineer a competitive national contest and prevent one-party entrenchment.
The moment calls for strategy, not sentiment. History is offering a second chance. Whether it is seized or squandered will define both Kano’s future and Nigeria’s democratic balance.
By Engr. Bello Gwarzo Abdullahi, FNSE.
Email: bgabdullahi@gmail.com
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